Just reminding everyone: I'm merely responding to the hypothetical scenario posed by John Lonergan in his recent 'The Hill' article.
Personally, I don't see China conducting an invasion of Russia. Though, if they did, I do believe the West would intervene, and likely on behalf of Russia.
Hopefully, you won't do something that stupid! As a Eurasianist, it would deeply sadden me to see China and the West carve you up between themselves...
I've seen a lot of nonsense scenarios like this over the last few years, all coming out of various Western think tanks and miscellaneous low effort commentators. They're all predicated on the idea that the Eurasian alliance will fail because either Moscow or Beijing will decide to become mentally incompetent retards and shoot themselves in the foot.
What sort of resources are there in Siberia or the Far East that Beijing desperately needs and Moscow won't sell them, or that the Chinese don't have the money to buy, even at very steep prices?
Those resources, the metals dug up and hydro-carbons pumped out from the desolate frozen Russian north to the mega cities and factories of the Chinese south, come back to the Russian north as a thousand different types manufactured goods that the Russians want, need and will pay good money for.
Why kill a man and burn down his house in order to get something he was already selling to you, and at a good price too?
Are we still living in the ages of Tamerlane and Genghis Khan where all the King needed to do was gather his horsemen, charge over the borderlands and seize the enemies' sheep, cattle and women?
Or are we now in a different age, with digital communications, surveillance satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple atomic warheads that can obliterate cities in minutes?
When Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon cut a deal with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong to split Moscow from Beijing, they had some serious things to trade to make that deal work. What does Donald Trump have that he could offer to either Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping, that would be worth them breaking their long standing agreements and alliances?
The only commodity that the USA produces at both the highest quality and in the greatest quantity is Homosexual Pornography.
Rebuttal to Comment on the Sino-Russian Alliance and Siberian Invasion Scenario
The commenter dismisses the scenario of a Chinese invasion of Siberia as “nonsense” predicated on the assumption that the Sino-Russian alliance would collapse due to irrational decisions by Moscow or Beijing. While the commenter’s skepticism of speculative geopolitics is understandable, their argument oversimplifies the strategic dynamics at play and ignores the underlying pressures that could drive conflict, as well as the historical and contemporary realities shaping Sino-Russian relations. Drawing on world events and my prior analysis, I rebut the commenter’s points, emphasizing the high likelihood of a Chinese move on Siberia, the fragility of the Eurasian alliance, and the modern incentives that could precipitate such a conflict.
Mischaracterizing the Eurasian Alliance
The commenter assumes the Sino-Russian partnership is an unbreakable bond, underpinned by mutually beneficial trade in Siberian resources for Chinese manufactured goods. This view overstates the alliance’s stability. While the “no limits” partnership, formalized in 2022, has facilitated trade—China importing $129 billion in Russian oil, gas, and metals in 2024 alone, per Chinese customs data—the relationship is not one of equals. Russia’s dependence on China has deepened since Western sanctions intensified post-Ukraine invasion, with China accounting for 40% of Russia’s trade by mid-2025, according to the Moscow Times. This asymmetry creates vulnerabilities. Beijing’s growing energy demands, projected to increase 6% annually through 2030 (IEA data), could outstrip Russia’s willingness or capacity to supply at favorable terms, especially as Russia’s economy strains under sanctions and military overreach in Ukraine. The commenter’s assertion that Moscow will always sell and Beijing will always buy ignores the potential for strategic miscalculations, particularly if China perceives Russia’s weakened state—evident in its stalled Ukraine campaign—as an opportunity to secure resources directly.
Resources and Strategic Incentives
The commenter questions what resources China desperately needs that Russia won’t sell. Siberia holds vast reserves critical to China’s industrial and energy security: 55 billion barrels of oil, 1.6 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, and rare earth metals like lithium and cobalt, essential for batteries and high-tech industries (USGS estimates). While trade currently flows, Russia’s economic fragility—its GDP projected to shrink to $1.5 trillion without oil and gas, akin to Belgium’s, as I’ve noted—could lead Moscow to demand higher prices or restrict exports to bolster its coffers. China, wary of over-reliance on a faltering partner, might see territorial control as a more reliable means to secure these assets, especially as domestic production wanes (China’s oil output dropped 2.5% in 2024, per CNPC). The commenter’s analogy to killing a man to steal what he sells cheaply ignores modern great power competition, where long-term resource control often trumps short-term trade agreements. China’s Belt and Road Initiative and territorial assertions in the South China Sea demonstrate its willingness to prioritize strategic dominance over cooperative trade when vital interests are at stake.
Modern Warfare vs. Medieval Conquests
The commenter’s invocation of Tamerlane and Genghis Khan is a rhetorical flourish that misrepresents the nature of a potential Siberian conflict. Modern warfare, with digital communications, satellites, and nuclear capabilities, does not preclude territorial ambitions but reshapes their execution. China’s advanced military, including its 2.1 million-strong PLA and sophisticated drone warfare capabilities (SIPRI 2025), could exploit Russia’s overstretched forces, depleted by Ukraine. My analysis highlights Russia’s drone and anti-drone expertise, giving it a 50-50 chance of repelling China, but Siberia’s vast, sparsely defended terrain poses unique challenges. A Chinese incursion would likely rely on rapid, precision strikes rather than medieval-style conquests, leveraging cyber warfare and logistics to disrupt Russia’s control. The commenter’s focus on nuclear deterrence overlooks the possibility of limited, conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold, as seen in India-China border clashes since 2020.
Western Leverage and Geopolitical Realities
The commenter sarcastically claims the U.S. lacks leverage to split Moscow and Beijing, citing the Nixon-Kissinger era as a high bar. This ignores contemporary realities. The U.S. and Europe, while favoring a weaker Russia, share a strategic interest in preventing Chinese hegemony over Eurasian resources, as I’ve argued. In 2025, the U.S. remains the world’s largest economy ($28 trillion GDP, IMF) and military power ($877 billion defense budget, SIPRI), offering potential economic and military support Russia could not ignore if faced with Chinese aggression. Unlike the 1970s, when ideological divides drove the Sino-Soviet split, today’s pressures—sanctions, energy markets, and regional power balances—create new fault lines. The commenter’s flippant remark about “homosexual pornography” as America’s only commodity dismisses its unmatched technological, financial, and diplomatic influence, evident in its leadership of AUKUS and the Quad to counter China. A Chinese invasion could force Russia to seek Western support, not out of ideological affinity but pragmatic survival, as a weakened Russia (potentially a “tinpot dictatorship” post-defeat, as I’ve noted) would have few alternatives.
Historical Precedents and Strategic Miscalculations
The commenter’s assertion that only “mentally incompetent retards” would break the Eurasian alliance ignores history’s lessons. Alliances collapse under stress, as seen in the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s, driven by border disputes and competing ambitions, or Germany’s betrayal of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1941. Current events—Russia’s faltering Ukraine campaign, China’s assertive moves in the Indo-Pacific, and mutual suspicions revealed in leaked Russian intelligence documents (NYT, 2024)—suggest the Sino-Russian partnership is more fragile than it appears. China’s strategic calculus could shift if it perceives Russia as a liability, especially as Beijing eyes Siberian resources to offset vulnerabilities in global energy markets disrupted by Middle East tensions (e.g., Iran-Saudi proxy conflicts in 2025).
Conclusion
The commenter’s dismissal of a Siberian invasion as an outdated or irrational scenario underestimates the pressures driving great power competition. China’s resource needs, Russia’s vulnerabilities, and the fragility of their alliance make such a conflict highly probable, as I’ve argued. While trade currently binds them, strategic mistrust and economic realities could push China toward aggression, exploiting Russia’s weakened state. The commenter’s reliance on outdated metaphors and oversimplified trade dynamics ignores the complexities of modern warfare and geopolitics. Far from requiring “mental incompetence,” a Chinese move on Siberia would reflect calculated opportunism, potentially reshaping global alignments in ways the commenter fails to anticipate.
None of it is the considered work of a human being. The grammar and style scream out its lack of authenticity.
"The commenter’s invocation, the commentators assertion"?
All of it wrong and fake, no wit, no humor, no imagination, no panache and no human imagination.
I guess you really are a Harvard MBA and write for "The Hill" after all.
But considering your (or your bots) actual points.
You give China a 50% chance of prevailing against Russia in a war to seize control of Siberia, which is also a 50% chance of failure and utter devastation for Beijing. But you also say in your other algorithmic splurge to Raynor "Even if China prevailed, maintaining control over Siberia would be costly and fraught with resistance, potentially forcing China to negotiate resource deals with Russia regardless of the conflict’s outcome."
And this is the real trick in spotting fake half-assed propaganda, one piece of bullshit just doesn't match up with the other piece of horseshit.
You give Beijing a 50% chance of avoiding failure and devastation but believe that even if it did win it would most likely have to negotiate resource deals with Russia. But that is what China is doing RIGHT NOW !
It's negotiating resource deals with Russia and is doing so without the costs of the horrific wreckage a total war between two nuclear powers would bring.
This is why China attacking Russia to gain Siberian resources would be an act of mentally incompetent retardation. This is Washington's grand strategy, bet on the Chinese somehow becoming morons.
Beijing and Moscow would break their deals if and only if they could be assured of getting something better from Washington, but what could that be?
The only possibility you mentioned is $USD which I admit Washington produces in greater quantities than anyone else but the quality of this commodity is falling and falling rapidly.
The fact that you could only cite $USD as the superior something that Washington could trade is very telling. 50 years ago with Nixon, heck even 20 years ago the USA could offer the world superior technology in so many things, computers, aircraft spaceships, weaponry medicine, all of that is now very nearly or totally finished.
And the most powerful thing that America could once offer the world, a superior and admirable culture is one of those things that is most definitely totally finished.
This is where the Gay Pornography bit comes in, it is glib but it's also highly relevant.
And you should know this, as a Washington insider you don't just get the gay porn, you get the gayest of the gay porn.
Aidan Maese-Czeropski, staffer for Maryland senator Ben Cardin, wasn't just sodomizing a man (or was he BEING sodomized? I'm not sure, please check with your boyfriend) in a senate hearing room for his own sexual stimulation, he was filming it and trading the video with other senate homosexuals for his further sexual stimulation.
There is an important cultural difference to be noted here, Beijing and Moscow consider that sort of behavior to be morally wrong.
But in Washington, that's just the way it is, and no crime was committed.
Is this seriously is the culture that Washington expects Moscow to break with Beijing for?
It's not going to happen, not for a trillion $USD not for 5 trillion.
At this time and under these international circumstances I can't ever imagine a Chinese move against Siberia. China doesn't even need Siberia, not if it has a decent relationship with Russia. Better to trade for whatever she needs and avoid the perils of war.
Also, it's better to get away from the zero sum game we've been playing for far too long.
Isn't it far more likely that America would welcome a Chinese invasion of Siberia inasmuch as it would split Russian attention between east and west, thus opening the door to NATO aggression from Europe?
Response to Alexander Raynor’s “Will Russia Join the West against China?”
Alexander Raynor’s article posits that a Chinese invasion of Siberia could fracture the Sino-Russian axis and drive Russia into a Western alliance, fulfilling Guillaume Faye’s vision of a global bloc of Western nations united against China. While Raynor’s analysis is imaginative, it underestimates the likelihood of such a conflict and overstates the feasibility of a Russo-Western partnership. My perspective, grounded in the realities of geopolitics, military challenges, and economic stakes, emphasizes that a Chinese attack on Siberia is highly probable, but the outcomes Raynor envisions are far less certain. Below, I contrast Raynor’s arguments with my own, highlighting why a Chinese invasion is likely, why the West would not readily support Russia, and the probable consequences for Russia’s global standing.
High Likelihood of a Chinese Invasion
Raynor frames a Chinese invasion of Siberia as a plausible but speculative scenario driven by resource needs. In contrast, I argue that such an invasion is very likely due to China’s growing energy demands and Russia’s vulnerabilities exposed in Ukraine. Russia’s failure to secure a swift victory in Ukraine, coupled with the strain of Western sanctions, has weakened its military and economic standing, making Siberia an attractive target for Beijing. However, as I note, China’s success is not guaranteed. Siberia’s vast size, muddy terrain, and harsh winters, combined with Russia’s drone and anti-drone expertise honed in Ukraine, make a Chinese victory a 50-50 proposition at best. Raynor overlooks these military realities, which temper the strategic logic of China’s pivot from Taiwan to Siberia.
Western Reluctance to Support Russia
Raynor suggests that a Chinese invasion would push Russia toward the West, as Europe and the United States share an interest in countering Chinese hegemony over Eurasian resources. I strongly disagree, as both the U.S. and Europe favor a weaker Russia and are unlikely to act in Moscow’s favor, even in the face of Chinese aggression. Decades of distrust, amplified by Russia’s actions in Ukraine, would make Western leaders hesitant to form an alliance with Moscow. Rather than rushing to Russia’s aid, the West might see a prolonged China-Russia conflict as an opportunity to weaken both adversaries, preserving their own strategic advantage. Raynor’s analogy to the U.S.-Soviet alliance against Nazi Germany ignores the unique ideological unity of World War II, which is absent in today’s polarized geopolitical climate.
Economic Catastrophe for Russia
Raynor correctly notes that losing Siberia would devastate Russia’s economy, but I provide a clearer picture of the stakes: without its oil and gas, Russia’s economy would shrink to the size of Turkey's, with a GDP of approximately $1.5 trillion, dropping it to 16th in global rankings. This economic collapse would reduce Russia to a second-tier power, a point Raynor underemphasizes. However, I also argue that China’s ability to exploit Siberian resources would be limited by the region’s logistical challenges and global backlash, a nuance Raynor overlooks. Even if China prevailed, maintaining control over Siberia would be costly and fraught with resistance, potentially forcing China to negotiate resource deals with Russia regardless of the conflict’s outcome.
Russia’s Strategic Options and Identity
Raynor invokes Alexander Dugin’s Eurasianist vision to suggest Russia might realign with the West, framing it as a European power. I counter that Russia’s leadership, steeped in suspicion of Western intentions, would likely resist such a shift. If Russia won a defensive war against China, it is likely to secure a resource-sharing deal with Beijing, maintaining its autonomy without Western reliance. If Russia lost, it would likely descend into a tinpot dictatorship on Europe’s borders, with minimal global influence, rather than seamlessly joining a Western alliance. Raynor’s binary framing—West or isolation—ignores Russia’s history of pragmatic diplomacy, which could lead it to seek alternative partners like India or Central Asian states.
Unlikelihood of Faye’s Vision
Raynor’s invocation of Guillaume Faye’s “Septentrion” concept—a global European alliance including Russia—assumes a cultural unity that is politically unrealistic. I argue that the 50-50 odds of Russia repelling China, coupled with deep-seated Western mistrust, make such a coalition improbable. Even if Russia sought Western support, negotiations over issues like Ukraine or NATO would be contentious, stalling any partnership. Raynor’s vision of a unified “European world” ignores the fragmented realities of modern geopolitics and the practical barriers to aligning nations with divergent interests.
Conclusion
Raynor’s analysis underestimates the high likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Siberia while overestimating the prospects of a Russo-Western alliance. My perspective emphasizes that such a conflict is probable due to Russia’s vulnerabilities and China’s resource needs, but the military and logistical challenges make the outcome uncertain. The West’s preference for a weaker Russia, combined with Russia’s economic fragility and strategic pragmatism, makes Raynor’s envisioned alliance unlikely. Instead, a Chinese-Russian conflict could lead to a negotiated resource deal if Russia prevails or a diminished Russian state if it loses, with global fragmentation more likely than a unified Western bloc.
What likelihood does your AI chatbot calculate for Western entities creating a psyop or perception management campaign to spread false stories about a possible Beijing - Moscow split?
So you agree, we DON'T need an AI chatbot for a psyop or perception management campaign to spread false stories, the NYT has done that already.
That the New York Times says it's so may be 24K golden evidence and the barometer of reality within the Beltway but not for the real world.
Show me the report.
Not the edited high lights of a write up of a series of claims from an anonymous source about a secret foreign report. Show me the actual report plus its verified source. Then we can talk about its claims.
What you have isn't even second hand unverified claims, its third and fourth hand totally anonymous and unverified accusations.
I do wonder, if China decided to move against Siberia, would you see potential for Europe and the USA siding with China since they’ve invested so much into the Ukraine war against Russia? Or perhaps a split between Europe siding with China but the USA with Russia? Such an interesting discussion.
Before you start to guess which way Europe or the USA would go in a Russia - China split, try to consider the When, Where, Why and How of that Russia - China split.
Just reminding everyone: I'm merely responding to the hypothetical scenario posed by John Lonergan in his recent 'The Hill' article.
Personally, I don't see China conducting an invasion of Russia. Though, if they did, I do believe the West would intervene, and likely on behalf of Russia.
Hopefully, you won't do something that stupid! As a Eurasianist, it would deeply sadden me to see China and the West carve you up between themselves...
I've seen a lot of nonsense scenarios like this over the last few years, all coming out of various Western think tanks and miscellaneous low effort commentators. They're all predicated on the idea that the Eurasian alliance will fail because either Moscow or Beijing will decide to become mentally incompetent retards and shoot themselves in the foot.
What sort of resources are there in Siberia or the Far East that Beijing desperately needs and Moscow won't sell them, or that the Chinese don't have the money to buy, even at very steep prices?
Those resources, the metals dug up and hydro-carbons pumped out from the desolate frozen Russian north to the mega cities and factories of the Chinese south, come back to the Russian north as a thousand different types manufactured goods that the Russians want, need and will pay good money for.
Why kill a man and burn down his house in order to get something he was already selling to you, and at a good price too?
Are we still living in the ages of Tamerlane and Genghis Khan where all the King needed to do was gather his horsemen, charge over the borderlands and seize the enemies' sheep, cattle and women?
Or are we now in a different age, with digital communications, surveillance satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple atomic warheads that can obliterate cities in minutes?
When Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon cut a deal with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong to split Moscow from Beijing, they had some serious things to trade to make that deal work. What does Donald Trump have that he could offer to either Vladimir Putin or Xi Jinping, that would be worth them breaking their long standing agreements and alliances?
The only commodity that the USA produces at both the highest quality and in the greatest quantity is Homosexual Pornography.
Rebuttal to Comment on the Sino-Russian Alliance and Siberian Invasion Scenario
The commenter dismisses the scenario of a Chinese invasion of Siberia as “nonsense” predicated on the assumption that the Sino-Russian alliance would collapse due to irrational decisions by Moscow or Beijing. While the commenter’s skepticism of speculative geopolitics is understandable, their argument oversimplifies the strategic dynamics at play and ignores the underlying pressures that could drive conflict, as well as the historical and contemporary realities shaping Sino-Russian relations. Drawing on world events and my prior analysis, I rebut the commenter’s points, emphasizing the high likelihood of a Chinese move on Siberia, the fragility of the Eurasian alliance, and the modern incentives that could precipitate such a conflict.
Mischaracterizing the Eurasian Alliance
The commenter assumes the Sino-Russian partnership is an unbreakable bond, underpinned by mutually beneficial trade in Siberian resources for Chinese manufactured goods. This view overstates the alliance’s stability. While the “no limits” partnership, formalized in 2022, has facilitated trade—China importing $129 billion in Russian oil, gas, and metals in 2024 alone, per Chinese customs data—the relationship is not one of equals. Russia’s dependence on China has deepened since Western sanctions intensified post-Ukraine invasion, with China accounting for 40% of Russia’s trade by mid-2025, according to the Moscow Times. This asymmetry creates vulnerabilities. Beijing’s growing energy demands, projected to increase 6% annually through 2030 (IEA data), could outstrip Russia’s willingness or capacity to supply at favorable terms, especially as Russia’s economy strains under sanctions and military overreach in Ukraine. The commenter’s assertion that Moscow will always sell and Beijing will always buy ignores the potential for strategic miscalculations, particularly if China perceives Russia’s weakened state—evident in its stalled Ukraine campaign—as an opportunity to secure resources directly.
Resources and Strategic Incentives
The commenter questions what resources China desperately needs that Russia won’t sell. Siberia holds vast reserves critical to China’s industrial and energy security: 55 billion barrels of oil, 1.6 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, and rare earth metals like lithium and cobalt, essential for batteries and high-tech industries (USGS estimates). While trade currently flows, Russia’s economic fragility—its GDP projected to shrink to $1.5 trillion without oil and gas, akin to Belgium’s, as I’ve noted—could lead Moscow to demand higher prices or restrict exports to bolster its coffers. China, wary of over-reliance on a faltering partner, might see territorial control as a more reliable means to secure these assets, especially as domestic production wanes (China’s oil output dropped 2.5% in 2024, per CNPC). The commenter’s analogy to killing a man to steal what he sells cheaply ignores modern great power competition, where long-term resource control often trumps short-term trade agreements. China’s Belt and Road Initiative and territorial assertions in the South China Sea demonstrate its willingness to prioritize strategic dominance over cooperative trade when vital interests are at stake.
Modern Warfare vs. Medieval Conquests
The commenter’s invocation of Tamerlane and Genghis Khan is a rhetorical flourish that misrepresents the nature of a potential Siberian conflict. Modern warfare, with digital communications, satellites, and nuclear capabilities, does not preclude territorial ambitions but reshapes their execution. China’s advanced military, including its 2.1 million-strong PLA and sophisticated drone warfare capabilities (SIPRI 2025), could exploit Russia’s overstretched forces, depleted by Ukraine. My analysis highlights Russia’s drone and anti-drone expertise, giving it a 50-50 chance of repelling China, but Siberia’s vast, sparsely defended terrain poses unique challenges. A Chinese incursion would likely rely on rapid, precision strikes rather than medieval-style conquests, leveraging cyber warfare and logistics to disrupt Russia’s control. The commenter’s focus on nuclear deterrence overlooks the possibility of limited, conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold, as seen in India-China border clashes since 2020.
Western Leverage and Geopolitical Realities
The commenter sarcastically claims the U.S. lacks leverage to split Moscow and Beijing, citing the Nixon-Kissinger era as a high bar. This ignores contemporary realities. The U.S. and Europe, while favoring a weaker Russia, share a strategic interest in preventing Chinese hegemony over Eurasian resources, as I’ve argued. In 2025, the U.S. remains the world’s largest economy ($28 trillion GDP, IMF) and military power ($877 billion defense budget, SIPRI), offering potential economic and military support Russia could not ignore if faced with Chinese aggression. Unlike the 1970s, when ideological divides drove the Sino-Soviet split, today’s pressures—sanctions, energy markets, and regional power balances—create new fault lines. The commenter’s flippant remark about “homosexual pornography” as America’s only commodity dismisses its unmatched technological, financial, and diplomatic influence, evident in its leadership of AUKUS and the Quad to counter China. A Chinese invasion could force Russia to seek Western support, not out of ideological affinity but pragmatic survival, as a weakened Russia (potentially a “tinpot dictatorship” post-defeat, as I’ve noted) would have few alternatives.
Historical Precedents and Strategic Miscalculations
The commenter’s assertion that only “mentally incompetent retards” would break the Eurasian alliance ignores history’s lessons. Alliances collapse under stress, as seen in the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s, driven by border disputes and competing ambitions, or Germany’s betrayal of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1941. Current events—Russia’s faltering Ukraine campaign, China’s assertive moves in the Indo-Pacific, and mutual suspicions revealed in leaked Russian intelligence documents (NYT, 2024)—suggest the Sino-Russian partnership is more fragile than it appears. China’s strategic calculus could shift if it perceives Russia as a liability, especially as Beijing eyes Siberian resources to offset vulnerabilities in global energy markets disrupted by Middle East tensions (e.g., Iran-Saudi proxy conflicts in 2025).
Conclusion
The commenter’s dismissal of a Siberian invasion as an outdated or irrational scenario underestimates the pressures driving great power competition. China’s resource needs, Russia’s vulnerabilities, and the fragility of their alliance make such a conflict highly probable, as I’ve argued. While trade currently binds them, strategic mistrust and economic realities could push China toward aggression, exploiting Russia’s weakened state. The commenter’s reliance on outdated metaphors and oversimplified trade dynamics ignores the complexities of modern warfare and geopolitics. Far from requiring “mental incompetence,” a Chinese move on Siberia would reflect calculated opportunism, potentially reshaping global alignments in ways the commenter fails to anticipate.
Verbose idiot, suitable for a well payed think tank job
Did you ever thought just one day in advance of your theory?
What would be the consequences, genius?
India and China know that inevitable rise to the position of the two most powerful nations on Earth, can only be blocked by Sino-Indian war.
Why would they start a war, knowing that in the event of war
India becomes US bitch, US proxy depending on US, and is no more strategically independent
China is blocked from ascending to the post of first among the nations, for a long, long time.
Why?
They know and they fight their war in Himalayas with sticks.
What would be the consequence of Sino-Russian war?
Ever thought about that?
Russia becomes US proxy, China gets bogged down in a conflict it cannot control.
Wet dreams. Idiots.
Verbose idiot
This is the reply of an automated AI chatbot.
None of it is the considered work of a human being. The grammar and style scream out its lack of authenticity.
"The commenter’s invocation, the commentators assertion"?
All of it wrong and fake, no wit, no humor, no imagination, no panache and no human imagination.
I guess you really are a Harvard MBA and write for "The Hill" after all.
But considering your (or your bots) actual points.
You give China a 50% chance of prevailing against Russia in a war to seize control of Siberia, which is also a 50% chance of failure and utter devastation for Beijing. But you also say in your other algorithmic splurge to Raynor "Even if China prevailed, maintaining control over Siberia would be costly and fraught with resistance, potentially forcing China to negotiate resource deals with Russia regardless of the conflict’s outcome."
And this is the real trick in spotting fake half-assed propaganda, one piece of bullshit just doesn't match up with the other piece of horseshit.
You give Beijing a 50% chance of avoiding failure and devastation but believe that even if it did win it would most likely have to negotiate resource deals with Russia. But that is what China is doing RIGHT NOW !
It's negotiating resource deals with Russia and is doing so without the costs of the horrific wreckage a total war between two nuclear powers would bring.
This is why China attacking Russia to gain Siberian resources would be an act of mentally incompetent retardation. This is Washington's grand strategy, bet on the Chinese somehow becoming morons.
Beijing and Moscow would break their deals if and only if they could be assured of getting something better from Washington, but what could that be?
The only possibility you mentioned is $USD which I admit Washington produces in greater quantities than anyone else but the quality of this commodity is falling and falling rapidly.
The fact that you could only cite $USD as the superior something that Washington could trade is very telling. 50 years ago with Nixon, heck even 20 years ago the USA could offer the world superior technology in so many things, computers, aircraft spaceships, weaponry medicine, all of that is now very nearly or totally finished.
And the most powerful thing that America could once offer the world, a superior and admirable culture is one of those things that is most definitely totally finished.
This is where the Gay Pornography bit comes in, it is glib but it's also highly relevant.
And you should know this, as a Washington insider you don't just get the gay porn, you get the gayest of the gay porn.
Aidan Maese-Czeropski, staffer for Maryland senator Ben Cardin, wasn't just sodomizing a man (or was he BEING sodomized? I'm not sure, please check with your boyfriend) in a senate hearing room for his own sexual stimulation, he was filming it and trading the video with other senate homosexuals for his further sexual stimulation.
There is an important cultural difference to be noted here, Beijing and Moscow consider that sort of behavior to be morally wrong.
But in Washington, that's just the way it is, and no crime was committed.
Is this seriously is the culture that Washington expects Moscow to break with Beijing for?
It's not going to happen, not for a trillion $USD not for 5 trillion.
At this time and under these international circumstances I can't ever imagine a Chinese move against Siberia. China doesn't even need Siberia, not if it has a decent relationship with Russia. Better to trade for whatever she needs and avoid the perils of war.
Also, it's better to get away from the zero sum game we've been playing for far too long.
Yockey would say Yes.
Idiots
Idiots
Idiots
Not everyone is stupid like Germans.
Three times in hundred years, Germans/German elites do incredibly stupid strategic mistakes.
Britain successfully organises coalition of the willing Europeans against the most powerful European power/state, for centuries
Against Spain, against France, against Germany, against Russia.
But it doesn't work with Asians
Even war between India and China, is really impossible. Neither Indians nor Chinese are stupid enough.
Germans are really unique.
Neutral Germany would have found a way to work with Russia, Germany as a partner and ally would make a most powerful coalition in the world.
War between Germany/Europe and Russia is the only barrier to being a world power for Germany/Europe.
Idiots
Isn't it far more likely that America would welcome a Chinese invasion of Siberia inasmuch as it would split Russian attention between east and west, thus opening the door to NATO aggression from Europe?
Response to Alexander Raynor’s “Will Russia Join the West against China?”
Alexander Raynor’s article posits that a Chinese invasion of Siberia could fracture the Sino-Russian axis and drive Russia into a Western alliance, fulfilling Guillaume Faye’s vision of a global bloc of Western nations united against China. While Raynor’s analysis is imaginative, it underestimates the likelihood of such a conflict and overstates the feasibility of a Russo-Western partnership. My perspective, grounded in the realities of geopolitics, military challenges, and economic stakes, emphasizes that a Chinese attack on Siberia is highly probable, but the outcomes Raynor envisions are far less certain. Below, I contrast Raynor’s arguments with my own, highlighting why a Chinese invasion is likely, why the West would not readily support Russia, and the probable consequences for Russia’s global standing.
High Likelihood of a Chinese Invasion
Raynor frames a Chinese invasion of Siberia as a plausible but speculative scenario driven by resource needs. In contrast, I argue that such an invasion is very likely due to China’s growing energy demands and Russia’s vulnerabilities exposed in Ukraine. Russia’s failure to secure a swift victory in Ukraine, coupled with the strain of Western sanctions, has weakened its military and economic standing, making Siberia an attractive target for Beijing. However, as I note, China’s success is not guaranteed. Siberia’s vast size, muddy terrain, and harsh winters, combined with Russia’s drone and anti-drone expertise honed in Ukraine, make a Chinese victory a 50-50 proposition at best. Raynor overlooks these military realities, which temper the strategic logic of China’s pivot from Taiwan to Siberia.
Western Reluctance to Support Russia
Raynor suggests that a Chinese invasion would push Russia toward the West, as Europe and the United States share an interest in countering Chinese hegemony over Eurasian resources. I strongly disagree, as both the U.S. and Europe favor a weaker Russia and are unlikely to act in Moscow’s favor, even in the face of Chinese aggression. Decades of distrust, amplified by Russia’s actions in Ukraine, would make Western leaders hesitant to form an alliance with Moscow. Rather than rushing to Russia’s aid, the West might see a prolonged China-Russia conflict as an opportunity to weaken both adversaries, preserving their own strategic advantage. Raynor’s analogy to the U.S.-Soviet alliance against Nazi Germany ignores the unique ideological unity of World War II, which is absent in today’s polarized geopolitical climate.
Economic Catastrophe for Russia
Raynor correctly notes that losing Siberia would devastate Russia’s economy, but I provide a clearer picture of the stakes: without its oil and gas, Russia’s economy would shrink to the size of Turkey's, with a GDP of approximately $1.5 trillion, dropping it to 16th in global rankings. This economic collapse would reduce Russia to a second-tier power, a point Raynor underemphasizes. However, I also argue that China’s ability to exploit Siberian resources would be limited by the region’s logistical challenges and global backlash, a nuance Raynor overlooks. Even if China prevailed, maintaining control over Siberia would be costly and fraught with resistance, potentially forcing China to negotiate resource deals with Russia regardless of the conflict’s outcome.
Russia’s Strategic Options and Identity
Raynor invokes Alexander Dugin’s Eurasianist vision to suggest Russia might realign with the West, framing it as a European power. I counter that Russia’s leadership, steeped in suspicion of Western intentions, would likely resist such a shift. If Russia won a defensive war against China, it is likely to secure a resource-sharing deal with Beijing, maintaining its autonomy without Western reliance. If Russia lost, it would likely descend into a tinpot dictatorship on Europe’s borders, with minimal global influence, rather than seamlessly joining a Western alliance. Raynor’s binary framing—West or isolation—ignores Russia’s history of pragmatic diplomacy, which could lead it to seek alternative partners like India or Central Asian states.
Unlikelihood of Faye’s Vision
Raynor’s invocation of Guillaume Faye’s “Septentrion” concept—a global European alliance including Russia—assumes a cultural unity that is politically unrealistic. I argue that the 50-50 odds of Russia repelling China, coupled with deep-seated Western mistrust, make such a coalition improbable. Even if Russia sought Western support, negotiations over issues like Ukraine or NATO would be contentious, stalling any partnership. Raynor’s vision of a unified “European world” ignores the fragmented realities of modern geopolitics and the practical barriers to aligning nations with divergent interests.
Conclusion
Raynor’s analysis underestimates the high likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Siberia while overestimating the prospects of a Russo-Western alliance. My perspective emphasizes that such a conflict is probable due to Russia’s vulnerabilities and China’s resource needs, but the military and logistical challenges make the outcome uncertain. The West’s preference for a weaker Russia, combined with Russia’s economic fragility and strategic pragmatism, makes Raynor’s envisioned alliance unlikely. Instead, a Chinese-Russian conflict could lead to a negotiated resource deal if Russia prevails or a diminished Russian state if it loses, with global fragmentation more likely than a unified Western bloc.
What likelihood does your AI chatbot calculate for Western entities creating a psyop or perception management campaign to spread false stories about a possible Beijing - Moscow split?
Perhaps by using AI chatbots?
no need to use an AI chatbot. Look at the revelations in the NYT of FSB reports.
So you agree, we DON'T need an AI chatbot for a psyop or perception management campaign to spread false stories, the NYT has done that already.
That the New York Times says it's so may be 24K golden evidence and the barometer of reality within the Beltway but not for the real world.
Show me the report.
Not the edited high lights of a write up of a series of claims from an anonymous source about a secret foreign report. Show me the actual report plus its verified source. Then we can talk about its claims.
What you have isn't even second hand unverified claims, its third and fourth hand totally anonymous and unverified accusations.
Weak, very weak.
I do wonder, if China decided to move against Siberia, would you see potential for Europe and the USA siding with China since they’ve invested so much into the Ukraine war against Russia? Or perhaps a split between Europe siding with China but the USA with Russia? Such an interesting discussion.
Before you start to guess which way Europe or the USA would go in a Russia - China split, try to consider the When, Where, Why and How of that Russia - China split.