The Founding Fathers and the Roots of Liberalism

by Michael Kumpmann

Michael Kumpmann examines the roots of liberalism, its connection to the American Founding Fathers, and the ongoing debate over human rights and societal responsibilities.

In my previous articles, I have discussed many aspects of the First Political Theory, liberalism, and its relationship with the Fourth Political Theory, both praising and criticizing them. This included examining the Austrian School, Agorism, and several Enlightenment figures like Voltaire, as well as their development from Hobbes through Locke to Rousseau and Kant. I have also reviewed the philosopher Leo Strauss, his views on liberalism and geopolitics, and several other related topics. However, I have not written much about the origins of liberalism and have not yet looked at the central political figures from this period of its development. Since this would indeed make sense, I dare to start with that here. Alexander Dugin also did this regarding the Second Political Theory, which he ultimately rejected, but he also considered and analyzed founding figures like Vladimir Lenin and Mao Tse Tung, highlighting the positive aspects of their thinking. I believe the same should be done with the First Political Theory.

The origins of the First Political Theory of liberalism as a practical statecraft lie in three countries: England, the USA, and France. France is interesting because it directly produced Napoleon as a more traditional “backlash,” but the French Revolution did not serve as a great role model. Both anti-liberals like Savitri Devi, Ernst Jünger, and Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as liberals like Erich von Kühnelt-Leddihn and Hans Hermann Hoppe, rightly characterize this revolution as the primal catastrophe of modernity and, in fact, as the essence of what kind of modernity must be fought against.

The developments in England were closely linked to those in the USA (especially thanks to the War of Independence). Therefore, it might be most interesting to focus on the American Founding Fathers. In particular, Thomas Jefferson is also interesting for anti-liberals.

Moreover, examining the American Founding Fathers also helps to better understand the dichotomy between classical liberalism and liberalism 2.0.

The Problem with Human Rights

Regarding the American Founding Fathers, it must first be noted that they philosophically based themselves on Locke’s concept of human rights. This concept is, of course, inherently worthy of criticism. Alain de Benoist has written excellent treatises on the highly hypocritical foundations upon which the idea of human rights is based. Carl Schmitt also showed very well how shaky this concept actually is. Even the Marquis de Sade already noticed that liberals criticize the human rights violations of their political opponents more harshly and are all too willing to sweep their own under the rug. Alexander Dugin himself also pointed out that liberals only grant people rights when they conform and participate in liberalism. (A good example is the current demand to partially revoke Björn Höcke’s¹ basic rights.)

However, logically, human rights must also be regarded as a flawed concept. The goal of a constitution is actually to establish a minimal state and limit the power of the state. At the same time, it is true, as Francis Parker Yockey said, that liberals possess a hypocritical “friend-enemy distinction”: The main threat to the citizen’s human rights under liberalism is the state. But who is supposed to ensure that human rights are upheld? The state.

Therefore, fundamentally, liberalism is a “putting the fox in charge of the henhouse” philosophy. And this is where ambiguity comes into play, turning human rights in a “minimal state” upside down. Where can human rights be violated? Theoretically, anywhere — even at home in the bathroom. So the state must follow the citizens everywhere to ensure that nothing will happen. Certain human rights also allow for other ambiguities in interpretation. For example, a person has a right to life. Does that mean the state is not allowed to murder the citizen? Must the state monitor that citizens do not murder each other? Or must the state keep citizens away from things like cigarettes since they shorten life expectancy?

Of course, it is like this: Part of the philosophy of human rights is the aphorism “Your rights end where the rights of others begin.” But it is not clearly defined when they do. The philosophy of human rights actually demands that citizens are considerate towards each other and consciously avoid crossing boundaries. However, if you know lawyers, you will notice that often the opposite is the case. Most people want to extend their own rights as far as possible and keep the rights of others as limited as possible. This leads to situations where judgments, contracts, and laws must regulate everything down to the smallest detail. See the fact that Apple’s iTunes terms of service are now much longer than the US Constitution. Or the following fact: Since the beginning of 2024, Mickey Mouse, in its earliest form as Steamboat Willie, has become public domain (without copyright). However, there is a debate over whether Disney could sue an artist if they depicted Mickey with red pants. For people outside the legal profession, this seems rather petty and far removed from “common sense.”

Such developments are not really the ideal of a minimal state that leaves its citizens alone but rather approaches the totalitarian opposite. Therefore, the liberal minimal state already contains a totalitarian seed. One could, of course, argue with Leo Strauss that human rights are not everything and that people also need virtue. And that this totalitarian seed arises more from liberals turning away from virtue and towards mere survival. Benjamin Franklin wrote several texts in which he regarded Aristotelian virtue ethics as the true foundation of the United States and argued that if this were lacking, the USA would collapse. This suggests that Strauss’ theory that the USA is built on Aristotelian virtues is correct and that this was exactly the intention of the American Founding Fathers.

However, one could cynically ask whether truly virtuous people would still need human rights or whether the mere necessity of human rights already proves that the people have strayed from the path of virtue. Of course, the latter is the case. What is also related to this is that human rights almost provoke the “tragedy of the anti-commons.” The tragedy of the anti-commons is essentially a situation where people use their rights to block each other to the point that the situation benefits no one. And human rights provoke such a situation. In a dispute where person X says, “I won’t give person Y this thing, and I have the right to refuse,” the only “retaliation” allowed by human rights is essentially, “You refuse to give me what I want, so I’ll refuse to give you what you want.”

It is also noticeable and interesting that in Western societies, phenomena such as NEET (Not in Education, Employment, or Training), Quiet Quitting (where people deliberately do only the bare minimum at work to avoid being fired), or movements like MGTOW (Men Going Their Own Way), where young male “failures,” because they cannot obtain what they want from society (usually happiness in love), adopt a total refusal stance towards society, and then the state and society often respond to this with coercive measures (especially on the issue of unemployment). This is often justified by the argument that such people do not recognize what is good for them. See my article on Kant and his problematic definition of reason, which boils down to “If you do not agree, you are not intelligent enough to be allowed to disagree, as only agreement is a sign of intelligence.”

Developments like those described are, of course, toxic for society and should not exist in this form. However, they can be explained with economists like Schumpeter (who viewed the family and its support as the main motivation for work and entrepreneurial activity) and Jordan Peterson’s theories on the importance of responsibility. From a human rights perspective, such total refusal is actually a legitimate decision.

A constructive cooperation within the framework of human rights is only possible if one thinks, “Yes, I have the right to refuse X, but if you give me Y in return, I am willing to give up this right.” This is because only then can a constructive discussion take place where both parties can agree to a deal that benefits both.

This is, in fact, not initially a bad thing and is normal. We existentialists also call this radical freedom. A principle of existentialism is the principle of radical freedom, which states that while there are rules, laws, obligations, and the like, there can never be a hundred percent certainty that the other party will follow them. Even if there are penalties for breaking these rules, the other party still has the option to break them and accept the penalty.

Despite this radical freedom, a basis of trust must be built where both parties can be secure enough that the other will keep the agreement. This requires a mutual desire to be seen as a trustworthy person, which also includes doing things one does not like but has agreed to.

Ernst Tugendhat wrote some good things on this topic. His ideas allow for the argument, from an existentialist perspective, that a market, in certain respects, encourages citizens to become more “moral” because the market compels individuals to adopt the mindset of “I must behave in a way that others can trust me.”

It becomes a problem when some people or groups take the position of “This is my/our right, so no consequences should follow for me/us.” Once such groups gain enough attention, the foundations of basic rights become unhinged, and the fundamental trust in society is undermined. Through “liberalism 2.0,” we have exactly this situation. This attitude of “It’s my right, so no consequences should follow” is alarmingly widespread today. The most well-known examples of this are many feminists but also many people from the millennial generation, for whom even criticism of their behavior is an attack on basic rights. It is noticeable that liberal societies have not been able to prevent such an attitude, which is pure poison for their own foundations, from spreading widely in the population.

Of course, in the spirit of basic rights, one should not respond to such rejection by violating the basic rights of others. But there is no basic right to freedom from any consequences.

Jordan Peterson said in several videos (drawing on existential psychologist Viktor Frankl) that it is foolish for everyone to constantly talk about rights since responsibility is more important than rights and that one can only find happiness by finding something outside oneself, taking responsibility for it, and even sacrificing oneself for it. (For example, family, a project, social causes, the nation, etc.) Because only this can provide a sense of meaning and fulfillment. One’s rights alone cannot do this. Peterson is, of course, right about this and comes surprisingly close to Evola and his description of the warrior ethic as the male path, with the essence of warriorhood being the willingness to suffer for something higher and more important than oneself.

(translated by Constantin von Hoffmeister)

1. Björn Höcke is the head of the AfD (Alternative for Germany) in the German state of Thuringia.