What’s interesting here is that the piece correctly identifies a real weakness in contemporary populism: many populist movements are united more by opposition to liberal managerial politics than by a fully coherent alternative vision of society. The discussion of de Benoist, rootedness, and the limits of abstract liberal universalism is probably the strongest part of the article.
At the same time, I think the essay occasionally blurs together very different strands of populism - democratic dissatisfaction, nationalism, Traditionalism, and civilisational politics - as though they naturally converge into a single worldview. This, however, is minor. I'd also like to add Tony Blair to your list of populists - I think too often we reach for the extremes when discussing populism.
I also think the critique of liberal technocracy is more convincing than the proposed alternative anthropology. Once concepts like rootedness, civilisation, and inherited identity become politically central, there’s an unresolved question about who defines them, how flexible they are, and what happens to people who do not neatly fit the inherited cultural model being defended.
Nevertheless, the broader point is important: contemporary politics increasingly feels ideologically exhausted, and many movements labelled “populist” are attempting - however unevenly - to reconstruct meaning, sovereignty, and collective identity in response to that vacuum. I've actually explored this topic recently in my article 'Why Populist Leaders Love Nostalgia' - I'd really appreciate an expert's feedback if you get some time to read it!
Thank you for your comment. I am not a nationalist; I was simply saying that this is what populism claims to represent currently. Like De Benoist, in a European context, I believe that the time for small nationalisms is over, especially as multipolarity rises. We need a Pan-European or a civilizational one. However, I am a localist in the sense that most decision-making power has to be decentralized and take place as locally as possible, while things like foreign policy, the military, and the single market have to be handled mostly centrally to strike a balance, even though going toward an offensive war should require a wide-ranging referendum, and perhaps countries that would not like to participate in it with their armies should not.
I do not think blending some strands of Traditionalism, democratic dissatisfaction, and civilizational politics is unreasonable. I am not saying they are all one and the same, but they can definitely influence one another to create something else from those three. People do not necessarily need to copy and paste everything, right? Even if you like Evola, for example, or De Benoist, you probably do not agree with every single word they say, because some of it might be outdated or you simply might not agree. By reading them, being influenced by them, and meditating on what they say, you certainly create your own worldview that is distinct from theirs. Correct?
That’s fair - I probably should have phrased it more clearly. I wasn’t suggesting you were simply reproducing nationalism or Traditionalism wholesale, only that the article draws together several currents that do not always sit comfortably together politically or philosophically.
I actually agree that new political syntheses emerge precisely through combining and adapting older traditions rather than copying them mechanically. My point was more that once concepts like civilisation, rootedness, or inherited identity become politically central, questions of interpretation and inclusion inevitably become contested. Thank you for clarifying your stance.
This essay's eloquent when describing how our current situation has become overly procedural, managerial, oligarchic, and increasingly detached. But when it asks “how the people are to rule” it oddly treats this as if it were an unsolved historical mystery rather than something large parts of the Western world, especially the United States, actually possessed for a comparatively long time. America once had genuinely democratic governance structures, however imperfect and limited, fundamentally built around decentralized and publicly accessible mass-member parties operating inside a politically, economically, financially, scientifically, and governmentally pluralized system with strong local/state authority, legal and regulatory variability, municipal developmental agency, local fiscal dominance, geographically distributed banking and industry, and broad public access points into decision-making. Those structures did not disappear because “democracy failed,” they had actually held through the 1930s and were getting re-invigorated, the beginning of the process that greatly degraded them was contingent on the US WW2. And then they were gradually centralized, standardized, professionalized, and transformed after WW2 and especially after the 1970s into the much more managerial-technocratic topology the essay now criticizes.
And it lasted a comparatively long time and it didnt go away over night and we still retain real pieces of it. At one point the essay seems its at risk of capture, well, more so than others? Monarchies arent? Communism isnt? If the the standard is no risk of capture then nothing meets the standard. If every system is vulnerable to capture, then monarchy, technocracy, communism, managerial nationalism, and "archeofuturist vanguardism" -- :-) -- are no less vulnerable than democratic systems; the real question is which institutional architectures diffuse power broadly enough to make capture more difficult, reversible, and publicly contestable.
There is also seems to be a contradiction in the essay’s proposed direction. It critiques centralized technocracy, procedural oligarchy, and detached elite management, yet much of its own “rooted” alternative still gravitates toward mythicized civilizational narratives, vertical anthropology, "archeofuturist" managerial direction, and identity-heavy frameworks that seem to just arbitrarily place immense power and decision making into a relatively small socio-professional network(s) instead of any discussion of any actual institutional mechanics
Hopefully, more essays I have in mind will be published here in the future, where I also propose solutions through potential institutions. However, there has to be a balance between topic and length in essays. I cannot include everything in one essay, as that would not be an essay but possibly an entire book or booklet. :)
The United States once had genuinely democratic governance structures, however imperfect and limited, fundamentally based around decentralized and publicly accessible mass-member parties. The Democratic Party, as a small "d" democratic institution, and the Republican Party, as a small "r" republican institution, were honest in their naming and functioned within a politically, economically, governmentally, financially, and scientifically decentralized and pluralized system that had legal and regulatory variability, policy variability, an intentionally diffused and pluralized private sector, and local fiscal dominance. These parties, while far from flawless, allowed for real representation, genuinely participatory governance structures even for very serious policy matters with real participation, and a level of public accountability in political, economic, governmental, financial, and scientific decision making.
However, after WW2 a long multi decadal transformation began due to the dirty deeds of a convergence of several interests and an assortment of powerful special interest groups, and then our parties were transformed into centralized, exclusionary membership organizations. The so called Democratic Party has become a technocracy party, and the so called Republican Party became a conservative party. Neither really represents their original principles of democracy or republicanism, and they don't offer meaningful access or representation to the public. This transformation of the parties has been accompanied by a broader centralization of political, economic, and scientific decision making, which has caused the effective loss of most democratic governance structures.
theres substantial reason to believe that the post WW2 moves inside the usa in these regards were contingent on us having entered WW2 and the continuation of deep centralization post 1970s may have been contingent on setting the planetary extractive structures of capital “G” Globalization, which much of our systems configuration still has dependencies on
What’s interesting here is that the piece correctly identifies a real weakness in contemporary populism: many populist movements are united more by opposition to liberal managerial politics than by a fully coherent alternative vision of society. The discussion of de Benoist, rootedness, and the limits of abstract liberal universalism is probably the strongest part of the article.
At the same time, I think the essay occasionally blurs together very different strands of populism - democratic dissatisfaction, nationalism, Traditionalism, and civilisational politics - as though they naturally converge into a single worldview. This, however, is minor. I'd also like to add Tony Blair to your list of populists - I think too often we reach for the extremes when discussing populism.
I also think the critique of liberal technocracy is more convincing than the proposed alternative anthropology. Once concepts like rootedness, civilisation, and inherited identity become politically central, there’s an unresolved question about who defines them, how flexible they are, and what happens to people who do not neatly fit the inherited cultural model being defended.
Nevertheless, the broader point is important: contemporary politics increasingly feels ideologically exhausted, and many movements labelled “populist” are attempting - however unevenly - to reconstruct meaning, sovereignty, and collective identity in response to that vacuum. I've actually explored this topic recently in my article 'Why Populist Leaders Love Nostalgia' - I'd really appreciate an expert's feedback if you get some time to read it!
Thank you for your comment. I am not a nationalist; I was simply saying that this is what populism claims to represent currently. Like De Benoist, in a European context, I believe that the time for small nationalisms is over, especially as multipolarity rises. We need a Pan-European or a civilizational one. However, I am a localist in the sense that most decision-making power has to be decentralized and take place as locally as possible, while things like foreign policy, the military, and the single market have to be handled mostly centrally to strike a balance, even though going toward an offensive war should require a wide-ranging referendum, and perhaps countries that would not like to participate in it with their armies should not.
I do not think blending some strands of Traditionalism, democratic dissatisfaction, and civilizational politics is unreasonable. I am not saying they are all one and the same, but they can definitely influence one another to create something else from those three. People do not necessarily need to copy and paste everything, right? Even if you like Evola, for example, or De Benoist, you probably do not agree with every single word they say, because some of it might be outdated or you simply might not agree. By reading them, being influenced by them, and meditating on what they say, you certainly create your own worldview that is distinct from theirs. Correct?
That’s fair - I probably should have phrased it more clearly. I wasn’t suggesting you were simply reproducing nationalism or Traditionalism wholesale, only that the article draws together several currents that do not always sit comfortably together politically or philosophically.
I actually agree that new political syntheses emerge precisely through combining and adapting older traditions rather than copying them mechanically. My point was more that once concepts like civilisation, rootedness, or inherited identity become politically central, questions of interpretation and inclusion inevitably become contested. Thank you for clarifying your stance.
This essay's eloquent when describing how our current situation has become overly procedural, managerial, oligarchic, and increasingly detached. But when it asks “how the people are to rule” it oddly treats this as if it were an unsolved historical mystery rather than something large parts of the Western world, especially the United States, actually possessed for a comparatively long time. America once had genuinely democratic governance structures, however imperfect and limited, fundamentally built around decentralized and publicly accessible mass-member parties operating inside a politically, economically, financially, scientifically, and governmentally pluralized system with strong local/state authority, legal and regulatory variability, municipal developmental agency, local fiscal dominance, geographically distributed banking and industry, and broad public access points into decision-making. Those structures did not disappear because “democracy failed,” they had actually held through the 1930s and were getting re-invigorated, the beginning of the process that greatly degraded them was contingent on the US WW2. And then they were gradually centralized, standardized, professionalized, and transformed after WW2 and especially after the 1970s into the much more managerial-technocratic topology the essay now criticizes.
And it lasted a comparatively long time and it didnt go away over night and we still retain real pieces of it. At one point the essay seems its at risk of capture, well, more so than others? Monarchies arent? Communism isnt? If the the standard is no risk of capture then nothing meets the standard. If every system is vulnerable to capture, then monarchy, technocracy, communism, managerial nationalism, and "archeofuturist vanguardism" -- :-) -- are no less vulnerable than democratic systems; the real question is which institutional architectures diffuse power broadly enough to make capture more difficult, reversible, and publicly contestable.
There is also seems to be a contradiction in the essay’s proposed direction. It critiques centralized technocracy, procedural oligarchy, and detached elite management, yet much of its own “rooted” alternative still gravitates toward mythicized civilizational narratives, vertical anthropology, "archeofuturist" managerial direction, and identity-heavy frameworks that seem to just arbitrarily place immense power and decision making into a relatively small socio-professional network(s) instead of any discussion of any actual institutional mechanics
Hopefully, more essays I have in mind will be published here in the future, where I also propose solutions through potential institutions. However, there has to be a balance between topic and length in essays. I cannot include everything in one essay, as that would not be an essay but possibly an entire book or booklet. :)
A new Social Contract is ready on www.Nordlandia.nl
The United States once had genuinely democratic governance structures, however imperfect and limited, fundamentally based around decentralized and publicly accessible mass-member parties. The Democratic Party, as a small "d" democratic institution, and the Republican Party, as a small "r" republican institution, were honest in their naming and functioned within a politically, economically, governmentally, financially, and scientifically decentralized and pluralized system that had legal and regulatory variability, policy variability, an intentionally diffused and pluralized private sector, and local fiscal dominance. These parties, while far from flawless, allowed for real representation, genuinely participatory governance structures even for very serious policy matters with real participation, and a level of public accountability in political, economic, governmental, financial, and scientific decision making.
However, after WW2 a long multi decadal transformation began due to the dirty deeds of a convergence of several interests and an assortment of powerful special interest groups, and then our parties were transformed into centralized, exclusionary membership organizations. The so called Democratic Party has become a technocracy party, and the so called Republican Party became a conservative party. Neither really represents their original principles of democracy or republicanism, and they don't offer meaningful access or representation to the public. This transformation of the parties has been accompanied by a broader centralization of political, economic, and scientific decision making, which has caused the effective loss of most democratic governance structures.
theres substantial reason to believe that the post WW2 moves inside the usa in these regards were contingent on us having entered WW2 and the continuation of deep centralization post 1970s may have been contingent on setting the planetary extractive structures of capital “G” Globalization, which much of our systems configuration still has dependencies on