In the Age of Trump, Time for a Polish-Russian Reset

by Marcin Skalski and Dr. Michał Krupa

Marcin Skalski and Dr. Michał Krupa argue that Russia does not pose a threat to Poland’s existence or its fundamental interests today. A Polish-Russian reset and de-escalation of tensions in Eastern Europe are in the interest of both countries. The historical points of contention between Poland and Russia were resolved after World War II and the dissolution of the USSR.

The elites of the Third Polish Republic have proven incapable of recognizing the key changes that are bringing concepts such as the concert of powers, power projection, or spheres of influence back into favor. Their intellectual and mental horizon extends no further than anchoring Poland within the institutions of the collective West, while contenting themselves with their own political and intellectual dependence. In the context of Polish-Russian relations, our ruling elites and leading commentators have deliberately reduced Poland’s sovereignty to serving the interests of the “eastern flank” of an imagined republic of the collective West. This ineptitude is particularly exposed now, as Donald Trump shows no intention of heeding various incantations, such as those about the inviolability of borders in Europe. Meanwhile, on the banks of the Vistula, geopolitical reflection is replaced by crude slogans, including in matters concerning relations with Russia. From Warsaw’s perspective, relations with Moscow require a thorough revision — not only to reconcile with reality but, above all, to redefine Poland’s national interest anew. The current elite of the Third Republic, which has sufficiently discredited itself with its attitudes, including in the context of the Ukrainian war, will not undertake this task.

A fundamental revision of the previous assumptions of Polish foreign policy is all the more necessary given that we are witnessing the twilight of the American presence in Europe and perhaps even the beginning of NATO’s erosion. Atlanticism is bankrupt, and contrary to the dreams of Polish neoconservatives and ardent proponents of the so-called Intermarium, the Russian Federation has not collapsed.

During World War II, the Big Three victorious powers decided to shift the Polish state westward, while also accepting the British Curzon Line as the postwar Polish-Soviet border. It was no coincidence that the most ardent advocate of Poland’s significant territorial expansion at the expense of defeated Germany was Joseph Stalin himself. The Soviet dictator, still uncertain of the outcomes in the area that would later become the GDR (East Germany), sought to expand the reach of the satellite Polish state, and thus the Eastern Bloc. The British opposed this, adding to their extensive list of “merits” toward the Poles by pushing for a minimal territorial program for Poland in the west, if only to prevent the postwar Eastern Bloc from growing too strong.

The paradox lies in the fact that the loss of the Eastern Borderlands (Kresy) and the annexation of the former German territories shifted the state’s borders westward yet geopolitically positioned Poland in the east. Meanwhile, in September 1946, in Stuttgart, Germany, U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes, in the name of countering Soviet influence in Europe, challenged the extent of Poland’s postwar territorial gains. Consequently, the USSR became, out of necessity, the guarantor of Poland’s western border against the revisionist tendencies of the Federal Republic of Germany, the so-called West Germany.

The unification of Germany in 1990, effectively the absorption of the GDR’s territory by the FRG (West Germany), resulted in a relatively soft landing for Poland. It was under the influence of the United States and Great Britain that a united Germany was compelled to confirm the existing Polish-German border and recognize it as binding. Poland transitioned relatively painlessly from one bloc to another, retaining the territorial gains from its time in the then-competing camp of socialist states. Remarkably, British and Polish interests aligned at this juncture. London was not interested in the existence of a strong, unified German state on the European continent at that time, and Prime Minister Thatcher even opposed the annexation of the GDR by the FRG. However, with the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Eastern Europe and its subsequent self-dissolution, the existence of a GDR stripped of its protector lost its raison d’être. The Third Polish Republic inherited the territory of the Polish People’s Republic (PRL), and with the dissolution of the USSR, it gained new neighbors to the east and north: Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia.

Thus in 1991, the situation shifted in Poland’s favor, as the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Although the USSR is commonly equated solely with Russia, this is a significant oversimplification, at least in the case of the former Polish Eastern Borderlands (Kresy). Lviv was Ukrainized, not Russified, by the Soviets, and similarly, Vilnius gained a majority Lithuanian population due to Soviet policies, not a Russian one. Meanwhile, the so-called “Russian world” (ruski mir) in Eastern Europe has its own confession — Orthodoxy — which, in this respect, does not intermingle with the Catholic-Polish world or directly compete with it. This is significant because, as Professor Andrzej Skrzypek from the University of Warsaw has pointed out, Orthodoxy has traditionally been a key factor in Russian identity. This makes it even more difficult to claim that the Catholic Poles of the Kresy are currently at risk of having their national identity Russified.

Therefore, one can logically conclude that the Russian Federation does not currently pose an existential threat to Poland. Everything the Poles lost in the East was taken by the Soviet Union after World War II, and today Moscow has no reason to annex any Polish territory. Presently, the former Polish eastern lands are not within Russia’s borders, and the Republic of Poland shares a border with Russia only in the former East Prussia. At the same time, an artificial substitute for the interwar “Polish Corridor” has been invented, with the notion of the “Suwałki Gap” being propagated — an idea as abstract as “Intermarium” or “NATO’s eastern flank.” Poland is supposed to share identical interests with Lithuania or even Ukraine, which isn’t even a NATO member, even though it is precisely with these countries that Poland objectively has conflicting interests in the Kresy region — an area that is a natural direction for the expansion of Polish influence. Meanwhile, in the Third Polish Republic, “references to Jagiellonian and Promethean concepts serve as propaganda to convince Poles that we are still pursuing historical Polish ideas, when in reality we are implementing the strategic goals of Western powers,” argues Dr. Mirosław Habowski from the University of Wrocław, commenting on the fantasies embraced by the Polish elite.

Currently, the historical lands of Poland and Russia, at least in the case of Ukraine, lie within the borders of the same state, creating entirely new geopolitical circumstances. Regarding the Ukrainian issue, however, Poland needs only a buffer space separating it from Russia’s main territory — and nothing more. The course of the Russian-Ukrainian border or Ukraine’s access to the sea is entirely irrelevant to Poland. What is more, as the Russian-Belarusian alliance strengthens, it is questionable whether Ukraine still serves as a buffer zone. It is worth noting that in Eastern Europe, there can either be a strong Poland or a strong Ukraine — and in its own way, the current weakening of the Ukrainian state can be seen as an opportunity for Warsaw to impose its terms on Kyiv, whether in the realm of historical policy or economics.

A reset of Poland’s relations with Russia and the establishment of spheres of influence in Eastern Europe are possible thanks to a unique and objectively existing situation in which the lands that were the subject of historical Polish-Russian disputes belong neither to Poland nor to Russia. The creation of Soviet republics with capitals in Minsk and Kyiv by the Bolsheviks, followed by the collapse of the USSR, produced an exceptional situation that has, in a sense, “reconciled” Warsaw and Moscow. Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and potentially Belarusian nationalisms, meanwhile, are directed against both Poland and Russia. The current border with Russia, on the other hand, does not give rise to any ethnic conflicts or territorial disputes.

Finally, it is in Poland’s interest to de-escalate tensions in Eastern Europe as much as possible. Poles themselves need a time of peace to address their deeply troubling demographic outlook. Moreover, cultural influences promoting anti-natalist attitudes, such as the LGBTQ paradigm, do not come to Poland from the East, but are an essential component of Western policy vis-à-vis Warsaw. Conditions in Russia still leave much to be desired, but it has been consistently introducing increasingly conservative legislation, and the Russian ambassador in Warsaw has never attended any rainbow parade here.

Meanwhile, it is precisely a multi-vector foreign policy, which provides room for maneuver, that enables an assertive stance toward the ideologized Western European elites, who see not only alleged Putinism but even fascism in pro-family and conservative policies. Viktor Orbán and Robert Fico have both proven that loosening the Brussels corset is possible even for a relatively small country. After all, it is not Russia that has dominated the Polish media market, nor is it Russians who are forcing Poles to close coal mines or bear the costs of a pseudo-ecological energy policy.

The “Russian threat” is generally an ideological construct designed to justify the continued parasitism of the Third Republic’s elite on its own nation and the progressive colonization of Poland by Western countries. “There is no indication that Russia intends to attack Poland. The attitudes of Polish politicians toward Russia are thus based on hysterical fear, frustrations, complexes, and some incomprehensible desperation,” writes Professor Stanisław Bieleń from the University of Warsaw.

Poland faces either a reset with Russia in line with trends promoted by the Trump administration or joining the ranks of the European war hawks at the behest of London, Berlin, and the ruling elites of the European Union. As usual, the cost of escalating a war spiral will be borne by Poles, who have, after 1989, made credulity a hallmark of their foreign policy.

Marcin Skalski is a Polish commentator and analyst based in Warsaw, specializing in Polish Eastern policy and the heritage of the Polish eastern borderlands.

Dr. Michał Krupa is a historian, political scientist, commentator and author. He has published in various American and Polish outlets. You can follow him on X.