Europe as a World Power: Continental Geopolitics
by Olivier Eichenlaub
In the face of a continent historically fragmented into state entities ever prone to waging war, there have been several attempts to unite Europe so that it could assume and fortify its power on a global scale.
Following the fall of Constantinople, in 1464 the Bohemian king George of Poděbrady suggested, for instance, that France and Venice ally themselves with Hungary and Poland to repel the Ottoman invaders. Two centuries later, Sully asked Henry IV to unite the Christian powers composed of ‘wise and royal economies’ so as to enable the French and English monarchies to counter the Habsburgs.
Although none of these attempts succeeded in imposing itself in a durable manner, they did nonetheless show that the unification of continental forces is a recurring European leitmotiv.
Over the centuries, this tendency has, in fact, manifested itself in three rather different forms. First, there was the imperial model, as encountered in the conquests of Caesar and Napoleon, taking on a more or less universal form through the establishment of overseas colonies. Next, we had the ‘Westphalian’ model, based on cooperation more so than on war, all within a framework of respecting borders and embracing a sensible balance of power. Last but not least, we have the third model, namely the one in which Europeans still live today, which involves economic cooperation based on liberal values rooted in the Cold War and the expansion of global capitalism. This third formula, which led to the establishment of the European Union, constitutes a most instructive political experiment, yet proves to be, generally speaking, incapable of perceiving the European space as a genuine territory of power.
Europe as a Market
Prior to the beginnings of European integration as such, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894–1972) had already become one of the ‘fathers of Europe’ by founding the Pan-European Union (1926). Through Paneuropa (first the book and then the monthly journal bearing the same name), he campaigned passionately for the establishment of a United States of Europe, reviving an idea put forward nearly a century earlier by Victor Hugo in his famous speech at the International Peace Congress (1849).
During the interwar period, the Pan-European idea enjoyed considerable success among intellectual elites. It was championed by, among others, Aristide Briand, who argued that ‘some kind of federal bond must exist between peoples who, like the peoples of Europe, are geographically clustered.’ Coudenhove-Kalergi suggested starting with unifying German coal and French steel under a joint management structure symbolically enjoying a common passport, a single currency, and even an anthem, specifically Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony (Ode to Joy). This pan-European union acted as a promise of a peaceful and democratic renaissance capable of making Europe the ‘head of humanity’ in a heroic sort of spirit, a kind of mystique founded on classical culture, Christianity, and a vision of chivalric honour.
The project thus went far beyond mere economic cooperation, as it pursued a civilisational objective that would earn it many enemies, both among communists and nationalists. Similarly abiding by continental rather than national logic, the German geopolitician Karl Haushofer (1869–1946) would, at about the same time, develop his theory of ‘Panism’ (Pan-Ideen, including Pan-Germanism), which had several aspects in common with the Coudenhove-Kalergi movement. Opposed to such a concept which he considered to be anti-national, Adolf Hitler would label Coudenhove-Kalergi a ‘cosmopolitan bastard,’ a fact that would drive the latter into exile in the United States following the outbreak of World War II. This episode would essentially bring the Pan-European movement, much of whose documentation is now lost, to a halt.
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This article is an excerpt from the Institut Iliade volume Europe — A World Power by Olivier Eichenlaub, brought to you in English by Arktos:
To offer a European alternative to the challenges embodied by communist Russia and post-war capitalist America, it was ultimately Jean Monnet’s (1888–1979) project that was adopted, albeit on a significantly reduced scale. Following the initial experience of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), and under the impetus of French Minister Robert Schuman, the European Economic Community (EEC) would ultimately be established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, before being renamed the European Union as a result of the Maastricht Treaty (1992), which enshrined its liberal principles. The number of member states then increased from six to twelve. The pursued objective was to create a privileged economic partnership in Western Europe, one that would lead to social, and then political, harmony. In reality, however, it was primarily a matter of developing an economic strategy so as to compete with the Americans and the Russians by establishing a demographic market commensurate with the ambitions of global capitalism.
This objective explains, among other things, the premature accession of ten Eastern European countries in 2004, invited to join the Union following the collapse of communism in order to break free from Russian influence and immediately embrace a capitalist market economy. Today, this results in a rather opaque unity: although 27 European countries are members of the European Union, not all are part of the border-free travel zone (Schengen), and not all of them use the single currency introduced in 2002 (as part of the eurozone). Furthermore, it should be noted that Switzerland and Norway have never truly sought membership, nor has Russia been invited, while the Balkans remain candidates and the United Kingdom left the Union in 2020, having joined it rather reluctantly to begin with.
Throughout this evolution, several initiatives have undeniably contributed to strengthening European cohesion and creating a sense of shared belonging. This is particularly true of the Erasmus programme and the euro currency. Following the mandatory standardisation of the university system at European level, Erasmus now clearly promotes student mobility, as well as the recognition of degrees obtained abroad, fostering a mindset of international exchange and experiences that are highly valued among young Europeans. Likewise, the euro also facilitates exchanges and comparisons, generating new forms of cooperation, particularly in cross-border areas that have chosen to transcend national borders and organise themselves into so-called Eurodistricts (in Strasbourg, Basel, Catalonia, and the Palatinate) or Euroregions.
Beyond these efforts, however, it must be said that the majority of European policies never draw upon the full historical depth that Europe actually possesses. Indeed, they generally never allude to Aristotelian logic, nor to Roman organisation (which largely shaped the continent), but instead often give the impression of being remotely controlled by the ‘Eurocrats’ of Brussels, all within a mindset that is exclusively based on liberal free trade and sometimes seen as undemocratic. Nevertheless, European power cannot exist in the absence of a strong sense of shared belonging akin to the sort experienced in the Middle Ages, when it forged political communities bound together by cohesive energy and civilisational patriotism.
In short, what Europe truly needs is the very antithesis of what the European Union suggests through its vague notion of a ‘European citizen.’ The same applies to the failed 2005 Treaty, which, despite having an interesting text, failed to provide Europe with a constitution that would reaffirm its Christian origins. This ‘obliviousness’ of one’s roots and history clearly shows that the EU refuses to address Europe in terms of its actual identity, which, from a geopolitical perspective, comes across as both paradoxical and counterproductive. Ultimately, this reveals the EU’s near-structural inability to transcend its own managerial, administrative, and regulatory prerogatives and perceive Europe’s power in its true civilisational depth .
Civilisation
Jean Monnet himself admitted that if he were to ‘remodel’ the European project, he would begin by emphasising its unity and cultural riches rather than its economic potential. This idea was also championed by the Franco-Czech author Milan Kundera in the early 1980s, in a seminal manifesto that draws heavily on the identity-based conception of Europe as seen from the East:
“Europe hasn’t noticed the disappearance of its cultural home because Europe no longer perceives its unity as a cultural unity. In fact, what is European unity based on? In the Middle Ages, it was based on a shared religion. In the modern era, in which the medieval God has been changed into a Deus absconditus, religion bowed out, giving way to culture, which became the expression of the supreme values by which European humanity understood itself, defined itself, identified itself as European. […] Just as God long ago gave way to culture, culture in turn is giving way. But to what and to whom? What realm of supreme values will be capable of uniting Europe? Technical feats? The marketplace? The mass media? (Will the great poet be replaced by the great journalist?) Or by politics? But by which politics? The right or the left? Is there a discernible shared ideal that still exists above this Manichaeanism of the left and the right that is as stupid as it is insurmountable? Will it be the principle of tolerance, respect for the beliefs and ideas of other people? But won’t this tolerance become empty and useless if it no longer protects a rich creativity or a strong set of ideas?”
– Milan Kundera, “The Tragedy of Central Europe,” trans. Edmund White, New York Review of Books 31:7 (26 April 1984)
In a display of remarkable insight, Milan Kundera highlights the issue without any risky attempt at offering a solution. He nevertheless clearly indicates that only a culturally self-assured and assertive Europe can aspire to ‘create’ civilisation, and that this civilisation will, in his view, naturally emerge in the shape of a romantic and updated synthesis of the cultural model that characterises the German mindset as well as the quite universal model of values that typifies the French mentality.
Whatever the case, this synthesis cannot be reduced to a sum of cosmopolitan norms specific to the ‘spirit of our times’; on the contrary, it must oppose them using its own values, which it can only define through the depth of its own historical existence, without succumbing to fads, self-censorship, self-flagellation, or the denial of the biological realities that have allowed Europeans to survive throughout history.
Similarly, Europe must not succumb to wishful thinking by convincing itself that peace can be preserved at the price of some ‘necessary’ compromise of principle. As pointed out by Julien Freund, the essence of politics lies specifically in identifying one’s foe and distinguishing between ‘him’ and ‘us.’ The French philosopher and sociologist also underscores the fact that in most cases, it is not ‘we’ who designate our enemy, but ‘he’ that defines us as such. No human community could ever achieve internal harmony and ensure its external security without accepting this reality.
It is precisely by giving a name to the very continent that they inhabit that Europeans became aware of their historically exclusive uniqueness and capabilities: the very notion of Europe can, in fact, be interpreted as a means for European peoples to forge a strong, shared identity so as to differentiate themselves from both their adversaries and the rest of the world. It is therefore essential to redefine ourselves as a genuine civilisation and a community with a shared destiny, including all the significant and tangible relationships that this entails. In all areas where struggle is possible, it is now becoming urgent to shift from managerial and economic compromise to a genuine cultural and civilisational paradigm, starting immediately…
To conclude, what we mean by “Europe as a world power” is not based solely on traditional political criteria such as the use of force, confrontation, coercion, or the ‘capacity to impose and destroy,’ as Raymond Aron put it. In the face of future challenges, a common international diplomacy and European army would obviously be most useful when it comes to anticipating risks, preserving the continent’s territorial integrity, and protecting its borders.
This geopolitical objective, however, which has only been achieved a few times throughout history, depends first and foremost on our civilisational awakening: Europe must grasp the very magnitude of the (demographic, migratory, and climatic) dangers that lie ahead and react accordingly, while also remaining confident in its own ability to once again embrace its geography by organising its territory in a manner that enables greater cohesion, innovation, and autonomy. This power, ultimately, is none other than our capacity to live as free peoples and collectively shape our own destiny.
Don’t miss Alexander Raynor’s exclusive interview with the author in Arktos Journal, recently republished in French by the Institut Iliade:
Reconciling Land and Sea: Olivier Eichenlaub on the Geography of European Power
·Alexander Raynor sits down for an interview with Olivier Eichenlaub, coordinator of the Institut Iliade's Research Division. Eichenlaub argues that Europe's uniquely interlocking coastline of seas and peninsulas predisposed the continent to power—and that recovering this inheritance means transcending Carl Schmitt's old opposition between land and sea.
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